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Note to the Reader 
In 1990, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Peace and Conflict Studies 
Program of the University of Toronto initiated a project, "Environmental Change and Acute Con-
flict," to investigate how environmental degradation and the depletion of natural resources might 
contribute to social strife and conflict in many parts of the world. 
Under the direction of Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell (American Academy), Dr. Thomas Homer-
Dixon (University of Toronto), and Dr. George Rathjens (Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy), the project undertook a series of case studies and conferences in 1991-92. During this 
period, researchers examined the links between environmental change and conflict in three areas: 
water scarcity, population displacement, and the economic repercussions of reduced agricultural 
and resource productivity. A total of more than forty participants from ten countries have contrib-
uted to the project. 
These two papers on the interplay of environmental change, population displacement, mi-
gration, and conflict were first presented at a workshop on "Environmental Change, Population 
Displacement, and Acute Conflict," held at the Institute for Research on Public Policy in Ottawa 
in June 1991 (see list of participants on page 66). Dr. Astri Suhrke's paper questions whether mi-
gration stemming from environmental degradation has resulted in significant conflict. Sanjoy 
Hazarika, a foreign correspondent for The New York nmes, provides a personal account of the 
human impact of environmental problems in the regions of Bangladesh and India. Jane Willms 
and Tad Homer-Dixon of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program deserve special thanks for 
· their extensive help with these papers. 
This Occasional Paper is the third in a series to be published from this project. The first 
in the series examined the potential for conflict over water resources (Peter Gleick) and the rela-
tionship of water degradation and scarcity to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the prospects for 
a peace settlement in the Middle East (Miriam Lowi). The second in the series focused on China, 
examining the problems of environmental degradation, economic productivity and conflict 
(Vaclav Smil) and long-term historical patterns of environmental decline and political conflict · 
(Jack Goldstone). The last issue in this Occasional Paper series will address the social conflict en-
gendered by a rapidly deteriorating environment in the Philippines (Celso Roque and Maria 
Isabel 0. Garcia). 
The "Environmental Change and Acute Conflict" project has been supported by grants 
from the Donner Canadian Foundation, Pew Charitable Trusts, the Royal Society of Canada, the 
W. Alton Jones Foundation, the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, the Asia 
Foundation, the Canadian Department of National Defence, the Rotary Club of Toronto, the 
International Development Research Centre, and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foun-
dation. 
Comments and opinions from our readers are most welcome, and can be directed to 
Dr. Thomas Homer-Dixon, or Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell (see inside back cover for addresses). 
This series is jointly published by the Peace and Conflict 
Studies Program, University College, University of Toronto: 
Thomas Homer-Dixon, Coordinator 
and the Committee on International Security Studies 
of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences: 
Charles A. haket, Chair 
Jeffrey Boutwell, Program Director 
Laura Reed, Editor 
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Bangladesh and Assam: 
Land Pressures, Migration and Ethnic Conflict 
Sanjoy Hazarika 
The New York Times 
I n many parts of the world, land scarcity contributes to illegal migration and ethnic conflict. But in few regions are these connections so vivid, 
painful, and divisive as they are in Bangladesh and the northeast Indian state 
of Assam. 
A flow of races, languages, cultures, religions and subnationalities 
meet in the Northeast of India in a melting pot that has spawned guerrilla 
wars and agitations for the protection of these identities. Yet, the region that 
comprises the combined basins of several great rivers - the Ganga, the 
Brahmaputra and the Barak - is home to one-tenth of humankind. B.G. 
Verghese, a senior Indian journalist, remarked that one of the hopes of 
improving the condition of hundreds of millions who live here lies in a 
"well-conceived integrated programme designed to uplift the marginal man 
[sic] in what remains the largest concentration of global impoverishment 
despite being blessed with great gifts of nature." 1 
The contribution of land and resource scarcity to the outbreak of 
ethnic conflict is readily apparent on the Indian sube-0ntinent. The January 
1993 riots in Bombay, which took a toll of more than 660 lives and devastated 
large parts of India's most important commercial center, go beyond Hindu-
Muslim clashes. The riots involved issues such as illegal tenants, new 
migrants from the countryside and powerful lobbies of slumlords and build-
ers seeking to evict these tenants and squatters to sell properties and buildings 
at a premium. 
The problems of social tension and sectarian suspicion are fuelled by 
other questions, including the burgeoning population and the strain on 
common resources and facilities such as drinking water, power and sanita-
tion. Both Bangladesh and India have failed to curb their population growth, 
despite high mortality rates. This factor, as much as the lack of political will 
and official zeal to curb population growth, has put greater pressure on 
renewable resources. 
© 1993 by Sanjoy Hazarika. This paper was prepared for the workshop on "Environmental 
Change, Population Displacement, and Acute Conflict," held at the Institute for Research on 
Public Policy in Ottawa in June 1991 as part of the "Environmental Change and Acute 
Conflict" project of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program, University of Toronto and the 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
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Funding is inadequate to meet birth control targets but more impor-
tantly, the initiative and drive at the grassroots level are missing. Religion 
and tradition are important cultural factors which inhibit population control 
in societies where a son is still favored over a daughter and children are seen 
- although this view is changing too - as insurance and providers for 
people in their old age. Women face discrimination too, especially in the 
northern and central states of India where they are largely illiterate and have 
no income of their own; this lack of status contributes to their lack of control 
over the number of children they produce. 
Land Pressures in Bangladesh 
Bangladesh represents one of the most brutal and hopeless statements 
of the human condition. The vast population that resides in the fertile basin 
of the Brahmaputra and Ganges rivers reaps few rewards for its great labor. 
The benefits of development funding reach only a small minority: large 
amounts are appropriated by corrupt officials, village power-brokers, politi-
cians, and military personnel. There are a few successful innovative schemes 
like the Gramin Bank, a rural bank that has developed branches nationwide 
and lends money only to the poorest, but these successes are rare. 
"The economic viability of Bangladesh has long been in question 
because of its over-population, poor natural resource base, vulnerability to 
natural disasters and undiversified economy dependent on the production of 
two crops, rice and jute," says Dr. Mahabab Hossein, one of Bangladesh's 
most prominent development economists who heads the Bangladesh Institute 
of Development Studies in the captial, Dhaka.2 
In numerous respects, Bangladesh represents the Malthusian night-
mare: too many mouths to feed and too little food, or too many people on 
too little land. The population of 115 million continues to grow at an 
estimated pace of between 2.2 and 3 percent per year. It has doubled in the 
past thirty years. The country's population density of 785 per square kilome-
ter is the world's highest.3 Bangladesh is one of the poorest nations in the 
world, with a per capita income of less than 170 dollars per year, half that of 
India. The country has struggled to increase its per capita income, but in 1986, 
half of the population still had inadequate energy intakes and 58 percent of 
rural children and 44 percent of urban children suffered from chronic 
malnutrition. The infant mortality rate was about 110 per thousand, one of 
the highest in the world. Less than one-third of the adults were literate, and 
although three-quarters of the children enrolled in primary school, two-thirds 
of them dropped out before secondary school. 4 
Nearly 80 percent of the agricultural land is already covered by rice, 
and nearly 60 percent of the country's investments are financed by foreign 
aid. The growth in population has led to a situation where the average farm 
holding is less than one hectare (or less than 2 acres). Despite their lower 
costs, high-yielding modem varieties of food grains have not been introduced 
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to all areas where they would increase productivity. By one estimate, such 
varieties now cover 40 percent of the cereal-growing areas, but their potential 
remains largely unexploited because of flooding. Estimates indicate that if 
irrigation were extended to 62 percent of the cultivated area, food-grain 
production would reach the level of 30. 7 million tons, a vast leap over the 
current level of 18 to 19 million tons. This output could feed an estimated 
185 million people at current levels of food intake. 5 
The story of Mugha ul-Khand, a former village headman, is a clear 
example of the trauma that accompanies the growing scarcity of cropland 
and the lack of new land frontiers. A bearded old patriarch, ul-Khand lives 
in the village of Modhupur, 90 miles north of Dhaka, the capital of Bangla-
desh. When I visited him in February, 1991, his small enclave was surrounded 
by parched fields. In normal times, these fields would have been abuzz with 
the hum of diesel pumps pouring water across the wheat fields. But now they 
were quiet because of a diesel shortage caused by the Gulf war. The family 
land usually grows barely enough wheat, rice, and vegetables to satisfy 
household needs. A small surplus of cereal is sold in the village market or to 
traders from the city who visit during harvest time. 
Mugha ul-Khand said his family had lived on this land for at least 
three or four generations. He asked: "What will we have left one or two 
generations from now? Perhaps something, perhaps nothing. For us, it is a 
question of survival. We will go anywhere because every year our land 
holding is shrinking, our families are growing. My father had twenty-four 
bighas of land; now my four sons have two bighas each. [One bigha equals 
approximately 0.35 acres or 0.15 hectares.] What can you grow on two 
bighas? In the future, we may have nothing. Yes, we will be prepared to go 
anywhere. To Assam, if necessary, if we can get land and live with dignity. 
But will the Assamese have us? There are man-made frontiers and preju-
dices."6 The younger ul-Khand said "we live by our wits in this country, for 
the land, despite its richness, cannot feed us any longer." Debts grow, families 
grow, but incomes from land holdings and the buying power of the Bangla-
deshi currency shrink. 
One of the other sons remarked that many young women from the 
village, especially unmarried ones, have left to seek a better life in the larger 
towns and cities. Every year, he says, the number who leave is increasing. 
Some are reported to have turned to prostitution to survive. The flight goes 
beyond the country's boundaries. Many maid servants in Calcutta and other 
towns and cities of the Indian state of West Bengal are from neighboring 
Bangladesh; so are many male construction workers and farm laborers. 
B.G. Verghese, the Indian writer, contends that: 
The Ganga-Brahmaputra-Barak basin has all it takes to be a 
granary. Its agricultural record has however been disappointing. 
Malnutrition continues to affect morbidity and productivity 
within national boundaries and the movement of refugees across 
international borders. This erosion of human resources, often of 
able-bodied men or the most venturesome among the populace, 
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has further undermined agriculture in the exporting areas even 
as it has aroused sensitivities in the importing regions.7 
Those who migrate are not interested, says Verghese, in agriculture, 
but in jobs that give them an income, a basis for survival.8 The attractions of 
more lightly populated lands across the borders are immense. Bangladesh 
has a population density estimated at 785 per square kilometer.9 The density 
of population in India's northeast is far less. 10 Assam's is 284 per square 
kilometer; the figures are 78 for Meghalaya, 262 for Tripura, and 33 for 
Mizoram. West Bengal, however, has a reported density almost on par with 
Bangladesh: 766 per square kilometer, the highest among all major states of 
India. 11 
Bangladesh maintains officially that its nationals prefer to go to the 
Gulf where there are opportunities, rather than to India which can offer little. 
Yet, most do go to India because as unskilled laborers, they find a ready 
market in the subcontinent for maids, building workers, and porters. Bang-
ladeshi journalists and officials privately acknowledge the fact of continuing 
out-migration. While economic conditions in the bordering Indian states of 
West Bengal, Assam and Meghalaya may not be ideal, they are better than 
conditions in Bangladesh. Land and work are available. Bangladeshi intel-
lectuals sometimes justify the outflow by saying that the world needs a New 
Demographic Order that enables nations with plentiful, cheap labor to send 
their workers across international boundaries. 
There are two basic factors that favor an immigrant moving from 
Bangladesh to northeastern India. One is that the migrant speaks Bengali, 
the language of the Indian state of West Bengal and of most of Bangladesh. 
Bengali is spoken by more than 170 million people in the region, making the 
Bengalis one of the largest linguistic groups in the world. Language gives 
access to jobs, property and education. A second factor is that many migrants 
have relatives on the other side of the border. 
An example of this cross-border mobility is the case of Rafique 
Sarkar, an insurance agent who is 36 and lives in Mymensingh, Bangladesh. 
This is a town of narrow, unkempt lanes, weary-looking buildings dating 
back to the British era, and crowds of people on the sidewalks. Sarkar and 
his wife live in a small flat on the first floor of an aging house. They originally 
came from the town of Hoogly, a part of the sprawling city of Calcutta, the 
capital of the Indian state of West Bengal. Sarkar came to what was then East 
Pakistan with his brother-in-law in 1967, who lived in Mymensingh. His 
mother also chose to live in East Pakistan, preferring an Islamic nation to 
predominantly Hindu India. But his father stayed on in the Calcutta area. 
They visit their relatives clandestinely, and no one has ever checked or 
stopped them. 
When the subcontinent was partitioned in 1947 into India (predomi-
nantly Hindu) and Pakistan (predominantly Muslim), the native Bengalis in 
East Pakistan (formerly East Bengal) chafed at domination by West Pakistan. 
A popular uprising in 1970 was crushed by a brutal Pakistani army crack-
down. Backed by India, the Bengalis launched an insurgency movement, and 
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then, when more than 10 million East Pakistani refugees had crowded into 
India, New Delhi launched an offensive that gave birth to the new nation of 
Bangladesh. 
Sarkar says that during the Pakistani army crackdown, 60 percent of 
Mymensingh's population of about 200,000 left for India. They stayed with 
relatives or in refugee camps. Sarkar went to his relatives in Hoogly and, like 
a majority of the refugees, returned home after the war was over and 
Bangladesh was born. But there were many who did not return and, according 
to Sarkar, they were predominantly Hindus. Now, Sarkar says, "the political 
and economic environment is better in India; we may even go back." Sarkar's 
example illustrates the ease with which a Bengali speaker from Bangladesh 
can merge into Bengali-speaking areas of West Bengal and northeast India. 
The task is made easier if the immigrant has relatives in the area who can 
immediately confer on him a degree of social acceptability. 
Out-migration has been a perennial feature of East Bengal since 
before the end of the British Raj; it continued through the years of East 
Pakistan and post-partition; and it continues today from Bangladesh across 
the borders of eastern India. More than anything else, the migrants are fleeing 
the poverty-related degradation of their lives that has given them little choice 
but to leave their homes for another land. 
According to one estimate, population growth in Bangladesh will 
slash in half the amount of cropland available per capita by 2025.12 This crisis 
is worsened by the fact that all of the country's good farmland has already 
been heavily exploited. "At about 0.08 hectare per capita, cropland is already 
desperately scarce," says the study.13 "Flooding and inadequate national and 
community institutions for water control exacerbate the lack of land and the 
brutal poverty and turmoil it engenders."14 
The Trauma of Flooding 
The poverty of Bangladesh is in no small way attributable to the 
region's vulnerability to natural disasters. Bangladesh seems to move 
through an unending cycle of floods, cyclones, devastation, death, drought 
and famine. Marauding rivers burst their banks and change course with 
impunity, and heavy silting raises the level of river beds and increases the 
size of the flood plains, wiping out entire villages and reducing even the 
moderately affluent to penury. More than one million people have been killed 
by floods since 1961. And the 1988 floods, the worst in recent memory, 
reduced rice production by 1.6 million tons and caused 1.3 billion dollars 
worth of damage to roads, railroads, houses and industrial machinery. 15 
Floods, however, are a necessary evil. They renew the land. Bangla-
desh's intensive cultivation depends on silt deposited on the flood plains by 
water-gorged rivers in the rainy season. ''The floods are essential to maintain 
the fertility of the soils, to replenish the groundwater and soil moisture for 
the winter season, to help maintain the extensive fisheries ... and to provide 
plentiful water to the monsoon crops. In normal years floods do all these 
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things without causing havoc." 16 On the other hand, experts in Bangladesh 
agree that the single most harmful environmental factor in the country is 
flooding. It has led to temporary and pennanent migrations, not only across 
districts, but also across international frontiers. 17 
Verghese describes the scale of the flooding: "A huge monsoon flood 
discharge, draining over 1.5 million square miles in five countries straddling 
both sides of the Himalayas and containing far and away the highest rainfall 
density zones in the world, funnels into the sea through the Bangladesh 
nozzle comprising barely 7.5 percent of the total basin. No other country 
anywhere faces a flood problem of the nature and magnitude that Bangladesh 
does."18 
The great flood plains begin at the foothills of the Himalayas in West 
Bengal and Arunachal Pradesh and roll through Assam, the plains of Bengal 
and Meghalaya and into Bangladesh and the mouths of the Ganges. The 
Ganges is joined at various times along its long route by the Kosi and the 
Gandhak from Nepal; the Brahmaputra is fed by the Subansiri, the Dibang, 
Kameng and Luit in Arunachal and then by the Barak and the mighty 
Meghna. 
The human factors in downstream flooding include growing human 
settlements and encroachments near river banks. In the flat valley areas, the 
natural drainage systems have been wilfully blocked, embanked or dammed; 
natural depressions and wetlands have been encroached upon and reclaimed 
for agriculture. Embankments designed to keep floods out often create a 
nightmare by trapping flood water within vast areas for months, especially 
in Northern Bihar state. This makes both cultivation and settlement of the 
land impossible. Road construction also changes the landscape. Roads are 
often the only high ground in lowlying areas, and building them involves 
moving millions of tons of soil and can make low-lying areas more vulner-
able. Landslides upstream, which contribute huge amounts of silt to rivers, 
are caused by weak soil structures, unstable rock fonnations and human 
activities such as the building of roads, bridges, and drainage channels that 
change a region's geography. 
Yet, despite the annual crisis brought on by flooding - and exacer-
bated by human settlement and development - there are ways in which the 
rivers' capacity for destruction can be reduced if not stopped. These steps 
include soil conservation, better agricultural and irrigation planning as well 
as upstream reforestation in the Himalayan foothills. Water catchment areas 
in the lower and medium Himalayas on a massive scale is another idea that 
engineers have been studying for some years. 
During the annual floods, the country is virtually trisected into three 
nations, each with the raging waters of an angry river as its natural frontier. 
The Meghna, Brahmaputra and Ganges divide the eastern, northern and 
western sectors during the flood season better than any artificial boundary. 
Floods cover the countryside like a vast sheet, often under a meter or two of 
water. One estimate says that one-third of Bangladesh is covered by flood-
waters every summer. It is impossible to grow even tall rice in such high 
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water, which forces people and livestock to migrate to higher ground; to 
neighboring, higher, better-protected villages and towns; to regions inside 
the national frontiers where land is available; and across the international 
frontier. 
Nature's raw power is seen when rivers deviate from traditional 
courses, slashing through soft soil and forging a new trail of devastation. The 
Centre for Science and Environment (CSE), a leading Indian environmental 
research group, says in a new report that the fragile seismic structure and 
ecosystem of the Himalayas is one of the biggest factors causing downstream 
floods and natural disasters. As the youngest mountain range in the world, 
with occasional earthquakes that kill hundreds of people, destroy property 
and cause enormous siltation of fast-flowing streams and rivers, the Hima-
layas are "naturally primed for disaster."19 The CSE notes: 
The Himalayan mountains (are) the youngest in the world, lashed 
by intense rainstonns and highly seismic ... floods therefore are 
inherent to the ecology of the flood plains of the Indus, Ganga 
and Brahmaputra ... the afforestation of the Himalayan moun-
tains can reduce the problem of floods in submontane plains only 
to a minor extent . . . there is no evidence to believe that 
ecological solutions like afforestation will control floods any 
more than engineering solutions like dams and embankments 
.... People in the plains will have to deal with floods whether 
the Himalayan ranges are covered with forests .... Secondly, 
ecological changes that_have taken place in the lowlands them-
selves, because of technological interventions to control floods 
and encroach upon the flood plains, have exacerbated the prob-
lem far more than the ecological changes in the mountainous 
uplands.20 
Water and silt move out of these mountains in explosive waves. 
Floods and the shifting of river courses are therefore inevitable. The CSE 
report explains: "Afforestation will ... have a limited impact in terms of 
changing hydrological conditions .... In other words, forests can moderate 
minor and medium floods. But human society will have to live with major 
floods."21 
The Brahmaputra of Assam is cited as an example. Its northern 
tributaries flow through more densely forested areas than its southern ones. 
Yet it is the northern tributaries that cause more flood havoc. They have steep 
slopes, shallow and braided water channels, and coarse sandy beds; they 
carry a heavy silt load and are prone to cause flash floods. Natural factors 
such as major earthquakes have played a critical role in determining the 
geography of the region, dwarfing human efforts to control the waters. The 
great Assam earthquake of 1950 changed the course of major tributaries of 
the Brahmaputra and raised the bed of the river and its tributaries by several 
feet. The low water levels of the main river at Dibrugarh rose nearly 10 feet 
and the bed of the Dibang was raised by nearly 20 feet. This resulted in acute 
flooding downstream and severe erosion of the banks.22 
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Bangladesh must also contend with tidal waves that sweep the 
southern coast every year between April and December, rising nearly 20 feet 
high at times and smashing storm shelters, villages, bridges, and killing tens 
of thousands of villagers. Some specialists say that global warming could 
make this much worse in the future. Although experts debate whether or not 
major climatic change and a rise in the sea-level will occur, most agree that 
large sections of Bangladesh's coastline are exceedingly vulnerable to inun-
dation by sea water. 
A study by Jehangirnagar University, Dhaka, says that 18 to 19 
million people are affected by flooding in Bangladesh each year.23 "The 
displacees of the river bank erosion are the most wretched of the landless 
poor," according to Rahman who describes them as totally dispossessed and 
is critical of donor nations for failing to develop policies to assist these 
groups. 24 Verghese notes that the continued misery provoked by flooding 
permanently depresses the economy of flooded areas, and there is thus "little 
incentive to depart from traditional agricultural practices."25 
The floods of the Gangetic Basin constitute a warning to administra-
tors, farmers, scientists and planners: they mean, in part, that the communities 
of the lowlands must learn to develop flood plains without merely relying on 
devices such as embankments. Flood-plains management on much of the 
subcontinent is weak. Few agencies, either in government or outside, have 
studied and developed ecologically sound management systems. Of the total 
area of 8.28 million hectares vulnerable to flooding in Bangladesh, for 
example, only 32 percent were protected by 1984-85 and 5.7 million hectares 
were still at risk. 26 The government wants to raise the level of protection to 
more than 40 percent during the 1990s. But managing the flood plains, the 
CSE report points out, is an extremely difficult task because of population 
densities and largescale landlessness. Resistance to new management prac-
tices is widespread. The effort must be launched, however, to help the 
inhabitants of this great, rich and diverse region live in harmony with nature, 
adopt self sustaining strategies with regard to natural resources and work 
toward a marriage of big and small technologies, engineering skills and plain 
common sense. 
Migration from Bangladesh 
The Scale of Migration 
The migration from East Pakistan/Bangladesh to India has resulted 
in the creation of a sub-nation the size of Australia within India. This 
population of between 12 and 17 million has moved illegally, without proper 
visas, passports or documents, and it has settled in northeast India. 
The exact extent of out-migration from Bangladesh (formerly, East 
Pakistan and before that, East Bengal) to India may never be known. Accurate 
determinations are hindered by many obstacles. Voting rights, ration cards, 
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and property deeds are held by illegal migrants. Census methods are flawed, 
the Indian census asks people to name their place of birth, and while some 
honestly report their birth place as Bangladesh or Pakistan, most do not, 
worried they may be ousted or submitted to police questioning. 
Language also presents a major problem in gathering statistics on 
migrants. In the 1971 census, Assamese speakers were listed at 8.9 million 
of Assam's 14.2 million population. People who spoke Bengali as their 
"mother tongue" were listed at 2.9 million. 27 It is widely accepted that the 
number of Assamese speakers was exaggerated because many migrants or 
their descendants gave Assamese as their main language instead of Bengali 
for fear of being harassed by police and evicted. 
Religious affiliations, on the other hand, are generally regarded as 
being more helpful than language in accurately determining the growth of 
the population of immigrants and their descendants (mostly Muslim), as well 
as the decline in the native Assamese (mostly Hindu). But figures from the 
1991 census will not likely be available for at least one or two years. 
In spite of these difficulties, rough estimates are available of the 
numbers of migrants moving over the years out of Bangladesh and into 
northeast India. A significant study by Sharifa Begum, of the Bangladesh 
Institute of Development Studies in Dhaka, represents the first semi-official 
acknowledgement by Dhaka of the size of the migration problem. According 
to Begum, between 3.15 and 3.5 million people migrated from East Pakistan 
to India between 1951 and 1961. And between 1961and1974, another 1.5 
million migrated. A national census was conducted in 1961 and 1974. The 
197 4 census was the first in independent Bangladesh. The latter figure is 
based on census figures and incorporates estimates of deaths from the 1970 
cyclone and from the Bangladesh liberation war. 28 But it appears to be a 
conservative estimate for it does not take into account the 10 million who 
fled the repression of the Pakistani Army in 1970 and 1971 before an Indian 
military victory allowed them to return home. Most of the migrants returned; 
yet nearly a million (believed to be mostly Hindus) stayed in India, apparently 
blending into the countryside. All this adds up to an outflow of 6 million in 
the 23 years between 1951 and 1974. 
In a more recent paper, Begum states that although statistics for 
migration are not available after 197 4, there is no valid reason to suggest that 
migration ceased at that time. 29 She adds that in fact there are indications that 
Bangladesh lost a substantial proportion of its population from 197 4 to 1981 
due to migration and famine. Marcus Franda, the South Asian scholar now 
with the University of Maryland, suggests that the rate of out-migration from 
Bangladesh actually increased in the 1970s. Frandanotedin 1981 that Indian 
government sources believed that the number of immigrants into Assam was 
more than 600,000; to Maghalaya more than 300,000; to Tripura more than 
200,000. By early 1979, he found that more than half the total population of 
3,000,000 of the Nadia district in West Bengal were refugees from Bangla-
desh.30 In 1974 and 1975, Bangladesh was devastated by a famine that 
affected millions of people and sent the destitute to seek shelter wherever 
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they could inside their country. Those who had the resources and energy to 
do so crossed the border into India. 
Based on the 1951 growth rate, the state of Assam should have a 
population of about 15 million. It has more than 7 million extra, according 
to the latest census.31 The extra numbers can be accounted for by either 
immigrants or their descendants. Provisional data for the 1991 census puts 
the overall population of Assam at 22.29 million and the growth rate at 2.23 
percent per year, a sharp drop from the 1971 figure of around 3.4 percent. 
The change in growth patterns indicates, first, a fall in migration from 
Bangladesh after the beginning of an anti-alien movement in Assam in 1979, 
and, second, a swing in out-migration from Bangladesh to West Bengal 
instead of Assam in the 1960s. Bengali speakers dominate in West Bengal, 
making movement into the area easier for migrants. 
Migrants to Indian Urban Areas 
Though Bangladesh persists in its strong proclamations that it has no 
illegal aliens in India, Bangladeshi communities have sprung up in New 
Delhi and Bombay under the shelter of flyovers and in Muslim-dominated 
neighborhoods. There are Bangladeshi beggars on the streets of the Indian 
capital. Politicians from the Congress Party and the right-wing, nationalist 
Bharatiya Janata Party have encouraged these Bangladeshi settlers, develop-
ing them as potential vote banks. The settlers benefit from a complex network 
of advantages, including development aid, education programs, and patron-
age, often at the cost of the original inhabitants. "There is no political will to 
deal with the situation," says one security official. 
While the Government of India declares that there are about 100,000 
Bangladeshi migrants in Delhi, intelligence estimates say the figure is 
actually closer to 200,000. The Economic Times describes a slum neighbor-
hood in East Delhi, populated by three thousand Bangladeshi migrant 
families. Abdul Kader and his fellow residents are on the voters' list, have 
plots of land and ration cards; and the government has even declared that he, 
and tens of thousands of other low-income workers, do not need to pay banks 
back for small loans they have taken. At first, Kader claims that he and his 
family of fourteen are refugees of the 1971 Bangladesh War, but he later 
admits that he first migrated from West Pakistan where he was stranded 
during the 1971 war, to Bangladesh. He returned to Bangladesh because his 
family was there. "In Pakistan," he says, "we used to work in factories, mills; 
there were more jobs, the pay was higher. In Bangladesh we were penniless 
labor, paid a pittance. Two meals a day was difficult." Kader and others paid 
local agents who smuggled them from Bangladesh into India. Those in Delhi, 
in a manner of speaking, are well-settled. Kader says he and his two brothers 
together earn an average of 50 to 70 rupees per day (about $2.50 to $3.50) 
from plying cycle rickshaws. This is a total of nearly $334 dollars each per 
year, which is double the average Bangladeshi income. "Our children are 
Bangladeshi communities 
have sprung up in 
New Delhi and 
Bombay .... The settlers 
benefit from a complex 
network of advantages, 
including development 
aid, education programs, 
and patronage, often at 
the cost of the original 
inhabitants. 
taught in a local school. Then they help out by picking rags. Overall our 
earnings are adequate, much better than we have ever had." 
Sheikh Barah is a tailor who lives in a one-room shack in New Delhi, 
near the luxury Oberoi Hotel. He came to Delhi in 1971, has never sought 
citizenship, but has voted twice in general elections. "We used to live in 
Dhaka," says Barah. "It was very difficult to make ends meet; I had just got 
married." So, one day, he and his wife packed their belongings and traveled 
by bus, train and on foot to the border near Calcutta. After slipping across, 
they boarded a train to Delhi where they have lived since. "We have not been 
back and have no plans to go back to Bangladesh," Barah says. "There is 
nothing for us there. Here we manage quite well: we have our own home, of 
course it's small; our children are educated free at the local government 
school and my wife helps me with my work." 
Government Failure 
Out-migration from Bangladesh over the years has had a severe 
impact on the ethnic, linguistic, religious, economic and ecological fabric of 
northeast India and West Bengal, regions that share a common frontier with 
Bangladesh. 
The prevailing view in the Government of Bangladesh supports the 
concept of an International Demographic Order, with migrants free to move 
where they find work, unhindered by international laws or boundaries. But 
India views the migrants as a potential security risk, whatever their reasons 
for migrating. Intelligence reports indicate that illegal migrants are pliable 
and easy to use in smuggling, in trans-border gangs, and in information-gath-
ering for extremist groups both on the Indo-Bangladesh border and on the 
frontier with Pakistan. 
The Border Security Force that patrols the Indian side of the interna-
tional frontier says that it detained more than 56,000 Bangladeshis trying to 
cross into West Bengal in 1990.32 Detentions and deportations of people held 
at the border in Assam and Tripura were far less, estimated at several hundred. 
"The rule of thumb in this game is that for every illegal immigrant caught, 
at least four get through, especially if they're Hindu," says one senior Indian 
diplomat, who knows the problem well. He states that the issue is raised at 
virtually every Indo-Bangladesh meeting of officials, diplomats and politi-
cians. "But illegal migration remains the unfinished agenda of every dia-
logue, the unresolved issue. It's really a dialogue of the deaf: we tell Dhaka 
these people are coming in, Dhaka says they're not Bangladeshis, they're 
Indian smugglers or citizens returning after illegally visiting relatives or 
friends in Bangladesh." 
Moves to deport aliens have been largely unsuccessful because of 
inadequate legislation, poor policing, political patronage, and economic 
compulsions. The Assam Government's Home Department said in 1991 that 
while 276,283 complaints against illegal immigrants were filed between 
55 
Out-migration from 
Bangladesh over the 
years has had a severe 
impact on the ethnic, 
linguistic, religious, 
economic and ecological 
fabric of northeast India 
and West Bengal. 
56 
1985 and 1990, only 6,456 were eventually identified as foreigners. Of this 
figure, 521 were deported. 
According to T. V. Rajeshwar, a fonner Governor of West Bengal and 
a fonner Chief of the Intelligence Bureau, not more than 20 percent of the 
total illegal flow has been checked. He says he knows in detail of Banglade-
shis coming across the border into West Bengal during the harvesting and 
sowing seasons, of rickshaw pullers visiting towns to work regularly, and 
students walking across to study in Indian schools. He adds that according 
to the state government, about 2.8 million Bangladeshi nationals entered 
West Bengal between 1972 and 1988. If one migrant is held for every five 
who get through, then illegal visitors to West Bengal over this sixteen year 
period numbered over 10 million. 
The Bengal figures are underplayed by politicians for their own 
convenience. Their parties (the Congress Party and the leftist coalition led 
by the Communist Party of India) have been in power since 1971, and they 
gain from migrants' votes. The political reality of the flight from Bangladesh 
is that it brings vote banks for cynical politicians of all hues and ideologies. 
Ethnic Conflict in Assam 
Historical Background 
India's state of Assam is a melting pot of tribes, languages and 
traditions. It produces a major share oflndia's tea, oil, jute and plywood. But 
Assam is industrially backward with little overall foreign investment or direct 
investment from other parts of India because of its great distance from major 
ports and expensive freight charges. The major investments have been in tea 
in the private sector and in oil and jute in the public sector, which have not 
benefitted Assam so much as the tea companies in Calcutta and India's 
foreign-oil import bill. Gasoline prices in Assam are higher than in New 
Delhi, and there are only two small refineries in the state, leading to 
complaints of exploitation by New Delhi. For the most part, Assam has been 
led by democratically elected governments, chosen by adult franchise. But 
between 1979 and 1985, a student-led agitation against illegal aliens from 
Bangladesh paralyzed the administration and the economy of Assam. The 
students agreed to stop their agitation after the central government gave 
assurances that post-1971 illegals would be deported and those who came in 
the 1960s would be disenfranchised for ten years. New Delhi also agreed to 
a large economic package that included new industrial investments as well 
as establishing technical institutes. The students fonned their own party and 
came to power in elections in December 1985. 
In the earlier part of this century, many migrants settled on the fertile 
riverbanks of Assam, creating distinctive areas where they lived a separate 
existence. These immigrants were first brought there by the British rulers to 
work on the railroads. Then, under a Muslim League Government in the 
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1930s, more were encouraged to come as part of a campaign to convince 
Britain that, when independence arrived, the province of Assam should be 
appended to Pakistan. That campaign failed. 
The 1947 partition of the subcontinent sent millions of Hindu refu-
gees from East Pakistan into Assam, West Bengal, Tripura, and into all parts 
of northern India. Later, international pacts between India and Pakistan 
conferred citizenship on those people who had left their properties, busi-
nesses and homes and migrated to either country before January 1, 1951. 
After that cutoff date, however, any person who entered India without a valid 
travel document was to be regarded as an illegal settler or visitor. 
Migrants, however, were generally accepted by the Assamese so long 
as they were only laborers and peasants. Social tensions began to surface 
when they acquired more land and began to prosper. They were then seen as 
a physical, religious and cultural threat to the lifestyles of the Assamese. The 
migrants developed into a formidable force, holding the balance between 
victory and defeat in dozens of constituencies. 
The price for the decades of influx was paid by innocent people, most 
brutally in 1983 when an estimated 4,000-5,000 persons died in a series of 
bloody incidents. Events that year brought Indian and world attention to the 
magnitude of the problem. One of the most brutal massacres in independent 
India took place at a little-known village called Nellie in Assam's Now gong 
district. These killings were widely viewed as the result of the strategy 
followed first by the Muslim League government in Assam before inde-
pendence and then by the Congress Party, to encourage immigration from 
East Bengal, later East Pakistan and Bangladesh. This strategy, which 
identified the migrants as solid vote bases, encouraged immigration, settle-
ment and listing of the migrants on voters lists and ration cards. The result 
was the sharp alienation of local indigenous groups which nursed their 
resentments until an opportunity presented itself in a student-led boycott of 
statewide elections to avenge their long-held grievances. 
Demographic Change 
The anti-alien agitation that began in 1979 underlined the fact that 
the Assamese, particularly the middle and upper caste Hindus, were as 
concerned about the potential loss of political power as they were about their 
ethnic and cultural identity. An Assamese legislator remarked at the time: 
"An offshoot of this population explosion has been a sudden change in the 
composition of the district's electorate. The immigrants are in an absolute 
majority in seven of the nineteen Assembly constituencies .... In five more 
constituencies they are numerous enough to be crucial for an electorate 
victory." 
The trouble began when, in preparation for an election to Parliament, 
ballot officials reported 600,000 names in one constituency. Students and 
other Assamese filed objections to 70,000 names, alleging these were Bang-
ladeshis with no right to vote. The All Assam Students Union (AASU), one 
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of the most influential organizations in the state, launched a movement 
calling for the deportation of millions of alleged "foreigners." AASU leaders 
placed the number of such foreigners or "Bangladeshis" at four million and 
said that they would swamp the predominantly Hindu-Assamese culture and 
disrupt the fabric of society, a composite of different ethnic strands ranging 
from Mongolian to Aryan. 
Strike after strike paralyzed the administration and government. A 
series of state governments rose and fell, and this political instability forced 
New Delhi's intervention and direct rule. Between 1980 and 1983, the 
agitation focussed on ways to draw national attention to Assam's plight. The 
movement brought men, women and school children onto the roads to defy 
government curfews and crackdowns. The agitators' means were largely 
peaceful in the manner of Mahatma Gandhi; they volunteered arrest in the 
thousands. The atmosphere was enthusiastic and large numbers of middle 
and junior government employees in the state administration supported the 
strikes and other protests. 
But there was always an undercurrent of violence. The confrontation 
worsened with agitators picketing oil installations and refineries and block-
ing the transport of oil-tanker trucks out of Assam. Police and paramilitary 
forces cleared the blockades several times. In the meantime, the Prime 
Minister, Indira Gandhi, opened negotiations with the students. They would 
not budge, accusing political parties of encouraging immigration and thereby 
causing the current crisis in the state. "We demand our constitutional rights 
and that foreigners be deported and detected to save Assam and the Assa-
mese," said Prafulla Mahanta, then president of the student union which 
spearheaded the campaign, and later, Assam's controversial Chief Minister. 
The violence stuttered on and the state administration feebly re-
sponded. Mrs. Gandhi demanded that the students call off their agitation, 
pledging that the Government would detect and deport aliens who had come 
since 1971. They should get back to their classes, she said. Angered by their 
defiance, she decided to force the issue through a poll. She could not have 
made a worse mistake. 
It resulted in the worst ethnic rioting in India since independence and 
the toll in those violent days has not been surpassed yet by any civil strife in 
the country, including the anti-Sikh pogroms of 1984 in Dehli, the anti-Mus-
lim riots of Bombay in January 1993 or religious rioting in 1990 and 1992 
over a disputed shrine at Ayodhya, Northern India. 
The students called for a boycott and for agitators to resist the 
balloting. When the vote was held, in some places there were only one or 
two candidates. In other places, there were only a dozen voters. New Delhi 
had to fly in balloting officials and transport them with armed guards to 
polling centers. Many balloting centers were deserted, with frightened junior 
officials from Delhi manning their posts, doodling on paper with nothing to 
do, no voters to guide, no ballot papers to arrange, and surrounded by hostile 
but quiet crowds of villagers. 
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The whole exercise was a farce. There was heavy polling in a few 
districts dominated by Bengali-speaking Hindus and Muslims, and also in 
tea-garden labor strongholds, which were traditional bastions of the Congress 
Party and made up its vote banks. Congress won an easy majority but the 
cost was frightening, since the exercise seriously damaged Mrs. Gandhi's 
political integrity and popularity in the east of the country. 
Massacre in Nellie 
The 1983 elections renewed old rivalries. The sectarian and ethnic 
tension added to the bitterness of tribal groups over land-grabs by immi-
grants, and the scent of violence in the Assamese resistance movement, 
created an explosive brew. 
In the flat fields of a sleepy village called Nellie, more than 8,000 
villagers, predominantly members of the Lalung tribe, surrounded Bengali 
Muslim immigrants and systematically set about butchering them. The 
killing began at about eight o'clock on a February morning and went on for 
nearly five hours before paramilitary troops heard of the incident from a 
survivor and rushed to the site. They were misled, they said, by local police, 
who were accused of complicity in the crime. 
Nellie and other villages that were the targets of attack are located 
well off the main road, a good hour's walk through fields and across canals. 
Local officials had warned senior administrators in the state capital about 
possible trouble in this very area and the need for urgent reinforcements. The 
forces never came. The following morning, the dried rice fields of Nellie 
resembled a bloody battlefield. Bodies were scattered across acre after acre, 
but none of the attackers had died. The only victims were Muslim immi-
grants. The toll was more than 1,700 from the five hour rampage. Entire 
families were wiped out; members of several families were lined up next to 
each other, from grandfathers to infants not more than a few months old. 
A study of the reasons behind the riots underlines a common factor 
between Bangladesh and northeast India: land. Many of the Lalung tribes-
people complained of the way they had been "duped" out of their land by 
successive waves of migrants, many of whom had lived in the area for 
generations. The migrants bought the rich, fertile paddyfields from the 
tribals, getting them to sign documents they did not understand, getting 
around British-made laws which disallowed the purchase of tribal land by 
non-tribals. "We have pattas (land deeds) to show we have the rights to this 
place, we did not deserve to die like this," said a young Muslim man named 
Motalib Khan. He and others proclaimed they had been born in Assam along 
with their fathers and broods of cousins. "We know the attackers," said 
Motalib, as he surveyed the carnage. ''These were people we had grown up 
with, played together, studied together, talked together, how can they hate us 
so?" asked Motalib. It was a question that none of his. fellow villagers could 
answer, but the fear and trauma behind that question remains. As Motalib 
asked, "We are Indians, not Bangladeshis, we were born here, where can we 
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go?" The attackers fled to the nearby hills. Only a few were caught, and the 
cases against them were never followed up. 
Assamese villagers say new migrants from Bangladesh have been 
coming stealthily to the area, drawn by their relatives and the possibility of 
a life of dignity. There were other conflicts elsewhere in the valley during 
the 1983 election between Assamese Hindus and tribespeople; between 
Assamese Hindus and Bengali Hindus; and more attacks by Assamese and 
native tribespeople on Muslim immigrants. In total, some 5,000 people died. 
In each case, the key issue was land. 
Ethnic Conflict in Tripura and Bangladesh 
Tripura is the only state in India, barring Sikkim, where the original 
inhabitants have become a minority in their own land. Tripura is a small 
thumb of land that juts into Bangladesh from Assam's southeast. An area of 
about 4, 116 square miles, it has a semi-tropical climate and is flanked on 
three sides by Bangladesh with a land border of more than 480 miles. 
Unlike Assam and West Bengal, Tripura has been swamped by Hindu 
refugees who have been coming since the 1950s. The state is a small area 
that was dominated by nineteen tribes with the characteristics of Southeast 
Asians. They are Buddhists and Christians, yet the state's population has been 
converted to a Bengali majority in a few decades. One estimate says that 600 
persons fled to Tripura every day after Hindus were attacked in East Pakistan 
in 1961. In 1947, 93 percent of Tripura's population of about 600,000 were 
tribes people. By 1981, they were reduced to a minority of 28.5 percent of a 
population of 2.06 million, and they had lost political power. 33 A bitter 
insurgency began in 1980 and continued, with hundreds of Bengalis being 
killed, until leaders of the movement signed a peace pact with Delhi in 1988. 
The leader of the insurgency, Bijoy Hrangkhawl, said that he was driven to 
revolt because he believed that the Bengalis would swamp his people. As 
part of the accord, the government agreed to rehabilitate the insurgency's 
fighters, restore old lands to dispossessed Tripuris, and check the illegal 
influx. But Hrangkhawl says that aliens are still crossing into his state, and 
he has warned New Delhi that failure to curb this could trigger fresh trouble. 
Indeed, a small insurgent operation, independent of Hrankhawl, has been 
attacking officials since mid-1991. 
Within Bangladesh, in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, south of Tripura, 
another ethnic conflict rages. The Bangladesh Government has pressed a 
settlement policy, encouraging Muslim, Bengali-speaking migrants to move 
to a thinly-populated but thickly-forested region where Buddhist and Chris-
tian tribal groups have lived for centuries. The ensuing clashes have been 
converted into an insurgency that is still continuing, taking a toll on settlers, 
the original tribal inhabitants, and the Bangladesh military forces. The 
insurgency is being actively supported by New Delhi, which sees it as an 
opportunity to control its impoverished neighbor. 
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By the year 2020, there will be 220 million Bangladeshis and one 
billion Indians competing for land and jobs. Without policies on population, 
migration, and flood and river control in the next few years, we will see 
clashing nationalities and ethnic groups on the borders of India and Bangla-
desh, perhaps on a greater scale than in Yugoslavia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. 
Conclusion 
Bangladesh, with its meager resources and swelling population, is 
simply not in control of its own destiny. The future of the country lies in a 
combined attack by Dhaka and its neighbors on the overpopulation and 
poverty that is sweeping the entire Gangetic-Brahmaputra basin. No nation 
in this region can operate in isolation. 
The following proposals deserve further study: 
First, a regional grouping that was set up in the mid- l 950s to help 
cooperation among the countries of the area - Nepal, India, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, Bangladesh, Bhutan and the Maldives - must muster the political 
will to ensure that policies are actually pursued. At the moment, cooperation 
is taking place at a very peripheral level and is limited to resolutions. A 
problem with the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) is that mutual suspicions among its members have virtually frozen 
relations between countries like Pakistan and India. India is regarded as the 
big power of the area which is constantly hectoring the others and trying to 
get them to fall in line. This suspicion is not entirely true although New Delhi 
does try to pressure the other countries on issues that it regards as important. 
Without political will, none of the other proposals suggested below can work. 
Second, governments must take administrative and security measures 
to stem the illegal flow of migrants. Countries that find it difficult to secure 
jobs for their own people will not be well-disposed toward other nationalities 
seeking those very jobs. It has been suggested that India and Bangladesh 
create a 150-meter "security belt" on either side of the international frontier 
that would enable better policing. But Bangladesh has rejected this sugges-
tion, given the country's acute pressures on land and the political implications 
of such a step. India is in a better position to implement the plan by shifting 
communities along the border to other areas and by compensating them 
adequately. 
Third, soil conservation, better agricultural and irrigation planning, 
and upstream reforestation can all be used to reduce flooding. These steps 
will help slow the Brahmaputra and its tributaries in their headlong dash for 
the plains. Fourth, water catchment areas in the lower and medium Himalayas 
should be organized on a massive scale to control run-off before the monsoon 
rains sweep down into the Gangetic and Brahmaputra valleys. Reforestation 
goes hand-in-hand with such a scheme. An obvious target for development 
is Nepal, one of the world's best examples of a devastated forest system, 
ruined by unscientific and reckless felling that has greatly reduced forest 
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cover in the past decades. Fifth, according to a 1986 CSE report, there are 
many places in the hill regions of India where small hydroelectric power 
generators ranging from "a few kilowatts to several megawatts" could 
energize rural communities. 34 Citing the example of China, which has more 
than 88,000 small hydro-power stations, the CSE report advocates small 
units capable of being built, maintained and operated by rural communities. 
Sixth and much more ambitiously, the founder of the Mitsubishi Research 
Institute of Japan, Masaki Nakajima, proposes a $500 billion plan to stimu-
late the world economy with a series of international projects financed 
through a Global Infrastructure Fund. A preliminary study proposes eleven 
large dams around the Brahmaputra loop where the Tsang-po, as the river is 
known in Tibet, roars through the Himalayan hills into the Assam valley. 
These power stations would generate 70,000 megawatts.35 
Seventh, Indian river experts say that giant, multipurpose dams on 
major rivers in Arunachal Pradesh, near Tibet, can store at least six million 
hectare-meters of water. They say this will reduce the level of floods in Assam 
and in Bangladesh. The dams there and on the Barak in Cachar would also 
protect the Cachar Plain and benefit the Meghna basin and Sylhet in Bang-
ladesh. Eighth, the reduction of the flood flow of the Brahmaputra by even 
a few feet would make all the difference for major displacement and property 
destruction in Assam and in locations further downstream. Verghese says that 
this could positively affect as much as one-third of the normally flood-prone 
areas of Bangladesh, release new areas for cultivation and settlement during 
the wet seasons, and create opportunities for irrigation in the dry season. 
Good logging techniques, sound soil conservation and cropping practices, 
as well as careful watershed management, could all contribute to flood 
control. The improvement of water conservation in the catchment areas will 
reduce, not stop, the fierce flooding downstream. But it will raise water tables 
for drinking and agriculture and contribute to sustainable and productive land 
use. 
But arguments in favor of the efficacy of large dams are countered 
by advocates of sustainable development. These groups say that India and 
other low-income nations cannot afford such mega-projects which may not 
be able to stand up to the high degree of seismicity and also face the problem 
of silting. They say that the benefits of such a scheme will reach largely urban 
populations and industrial belts, benefitting middle class groups, and not 
rural populations. Cities and industry are among the largest consumers of 
power. 
Those opposed to the construction of the Narmada Dam in central 
and western India, India's most controversial development project, say that 
these and other factors, regarding the rights of the displaced, are not taken 
into consideration when such projects are conceived. The leaders of the 
anti-Narmada project say that local villagers and communities should be 
consulted on such issues and that decisions about their lives should not be 
taken at state or national capitals. They also say that smaller dams, with lower 
outlays, and the harnessing of alternative energy sources, such as solar and 
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wind power, are the right path for development for a nation of India's size 
with its financial restraints and pressure on natural resources. 
Despite the obstacles, there is no choice but to cooperate, to pool 
resources and expertise, and to work for a marriage of great dams, small 
projects and local conservation. This will help the populations of these 
regions avoid bitter conflicts arising from the destruction of the commons, 
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